

INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Political Science 864
Fall 2019
Wednesday 4:00-6:00 PM
Education L177

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COURSE OVERVIEW

This course is a Ph.D-level research seminar in international political economy (IPE). Its purpose is to review classic and recent research in IPE and gain insight into the international and domestic politics of trade, money, finance, and migration. A central goal of the course is to identify the welfare effects and distributional consequences of governments' foreign economic policy decisions, and to use the tools of political science to analyze how interest groups, voters, institutions, ideas, and power politics interact to shape policy outcomes (both domestically and internationally). The ultimate purpose of this course is to generate ideas for your own research, including papers and dissertation topics.

COURSE LEARNING GOALS AND OUTCOMES

This course has three main goals:

1. Knowledge of the field of IPE

As in any subfield, it is critical to understand what we already know before we try to answer an existing question or explore new puzzles. You may have lots of interesting theories about how the world works, but before you spend (literally) years of your life working to get a paper published on a particular question, you should be sure that someone else hasn't already provided a compelling answer. To help with this goal, I've included a "further reading" list containing many "classics" in the field – works that have been heavily cited, and that serve as a touchstone for more general discussion among scholars. While we will not always discuss these in detail during class, they will be invaluable resources for you in your research paper work.

2. Capacity to critique existing work

The published works we will read in this course represent classics and the state of the art in IPE. However, merely because a paper or book has been assigned in this class does not mean that it is the final word on the subject. No paper is perfect – sometimes this happens because newer

methodological approaches supplant prior ones, or because new events suggest that our prior theoretical models were incomplete. The purpose of science is to refine our accumulation of knowledge about the world, and it is impossible to do this if you are incapable of recognizing the shortcomings of existing work.

3. Ideas for new research

While learning to effectively identify problems with work done by others is a critical piece of developing your own capacity to conduct research, this is not the final destination for training in graduate school. It is very common for students in their first few years of a Ph.D. program to become adept at tearing down the work of others, but never learn the step which is actually the most important for your success as an academic: What can we do better? How do we push forward to increase our understanding of the answers to both existing puzzles and new questions. In the years ahead, you will be much better regarded by other scholars if you not only identify issues, but also propose solutions. This, fundamentally, is the heart of what we should do as scholars and social scientists, and so you should always try to think of ways that existing approaches could be improved.

The main learning outcome of this course is to prepare students, by meeting each of these three goals, for successful completion of the departmental preliminary examination in International Relations and successful pursuit of their own future research projects, including the dissertation.

COURSE CREDIT

This is a 3-credit course. The credit standard for this course is met by an expectation of a total of 135 hours of student engagement with the courses learning activities (at least 45 hours per credit), which include class seminar time, reading, writing, and other student work as described in the syllabus.

COURSE REQUIREMENTS

Grades in the course will be based on the following (% of total grade):

Participation (30%)

This is a graduate seminar, with the emphasis on careful reading and intensive discussion. I expect you to come to class having done all of the reading, which I have kept as manageable as possible for this reason. **I strongly suggest that you print out all and read hard copies of the articles, that you take handwritten notes while you read**, and that you go back and review both your notes and the readings before class, so that we can have a focused, detailed seminar discussion. We will not spend class simply summarizing the arguments in the material. Rather, the goal of our discussions will be to analyze, critique, and compare the readings, with an eye toward identifying and discussing the major issues/themes of the week.

We will discuss how to think about the main pieces of a research paper during the first week of class, but in general you should try to answer the following set of questions as you read each piece on the syllabus:

- *Research question*: What is this paper about? What is the topic/puzzle that the authors explore?
- *Argument*: What is the main theory developed in the piece? What assumptions does it make? Are these reasonable?
- *Evidence*: How do the authors test their theory? Do their measures match well the main components of their argument? Are there issues with the way the data are analyzed (either quantitatively or qualitatively)?

Seminar discussion format

To facilitate discussion, we will be running the first hour of seminar each week in a format similar to that of an abbreviated APSA conference panel. We will proceed as follows:

- Each week (beginning in week 2), two of you will serve as discussants (each for half of the readings), while 5-6 other individuals will serve as “panelists” (i.e., role-playing the author(s) of one of the assigned readings).
- Each “panelist” will each give a *brief* (~2-3 minute) summary of her assigned reading, as if she had written the paper herself. The goal will be to describe the puzzle; summarize the theoretical argument, research design, and empirical findings; and summarize the implications of the research.
- Following the “panelists” presentations, the two discussants will each offer a *brief* (~4-5 minute) analysis/discussion of the papers as a group. These discussant presentations should raise both specific theoretical and empirical points/questions about each individual paper *and* broader questions about the “panel”/topic that will shape discussion for the remainder of class.
- Following the discussants’ presentations, we will move into a 10-15 minute Q&A/discussion among the “panelists” and audience.
- For the second hour of class, we will then break character and discuss the readings and topics in a more traditional seminar-style discussion.

Article referee report (20%)

- Due on **October 4** (~4-5 pages, double spaced). Your first assignment is to write a “review” one of the papers presented at the International Political Economy Society (IPES) conference in November 2018. The papers are available here: <https://www.internationalpoliticaleconomysociety.org/conference-2018-program>. The goal is to write this like a review for an academic journal. At a minimum, this should include: 1) a very brief review of the main argument, 2) comments and criticisms of the theory, 3) comments and criticisms on the empirical analysis, 4) some suggested changes; and 5) a recommendation (reject, revise and resubmit, publish). I will circulate examples of article reviews from professors in the department for you to use as templates. You may pick any paper from the conference that is not already assigned on the syllabus.

Research paper

- **First draft/research design (20%, ~15 pages, double spaced), due November 2. Final paper due on December 15 (30%, ~25-35 pages, double spaced).** Students will write an original research paper on a topic related to IPE (broadly defined). Most successful papers take many months and often years to reach their final stage. Thus, the paper for this course should be well-advanced but is not expected to be fully complete by the end of the semester. Students should meet with me to discuss what this means in each of their specific cases. In general, the expectations as to what papers should look like at the end of the semester include:
 - 1) Introduce and identify a puzzle related to international political economy.
 - 2) Situate the puzzle in the relevant literature. In particular, the student should focus on existing explanations for the identified puzzle. This means the student must read and review literature beyond the scope of the syllabus.
 - 3) Offer a theory or explanation of the puzzle. Often theory sections also draw on the literature for inspiration or support.
 - 4) Articulate testable hypotheses.
 - 5) Articulate a full research design. This should include explanations as to why specific quantitative and/or qualitative methods are chosen and measurement strategies for the variables under consideration.
 - 6) Provide summary statistics relevant to the research puzzle and methodological approach. Note that authors can and do provide kinds of summary statistics for quantitative or qualitative research approaches.
 - 7) Carry out the research design at least in part by doing preliminary tests of the hypotheses. Again, students should discuss specifics with the professor.
 - 8) Spell out in detail what additional research is necessary to complete the paper.

For the first draft, students should aim to complete 1)-5). Given time and workload constraints, I do not expect that students will fully complete their papers (in terms of producing a paper ready for journal submission) by the end of the semester. This is for professionalization reasons. Like faculty, students must learn how to balance their short-term tasks (TA work, coursework, etc.) with long-term ones, like completing this paper. I will be as responsive as possible to proposals, partial drafts, discussions, etc. throughout the semester, but the onus is on you to set and follow your own path. I will not be helpful with “last minute” questions or requests for extensive draft reviews in the last days of the semester. Papers written at the last minute – whether for this course or for future conferences – are almost universally of low quality.

Given the assignment’s focus on theory and research design, you should minimize data collection work such as coding. The expectations are that this paper will have a well-developed front-half and more of an initial empirical analysis than a fully implemented analysis in the second half. In aid of this, I encourage you to draw on a comprehensive database of variables common to political economy research. This data will surely prove useful for students pursuing quantitative and/or qualitative research designs:

- Graham, Benjamin A.T. and Jacob R. Tucker. 2017. "The International Political Economy Data Resource." *Review of International Organizations*.

BACKGROUND

The course assumes knowledge of the material covered in PS 857, Theories of International Relations or the equivalent. Some prior course background in international economics is also extremely helpful, but not required. Students without such background (e.g., undergraduate courses in micro/macroeconomics), or in need of a refresher, are encouraged to consult a basic international economic textbook, such as Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz's *International Economics*, or Caves, Frankel, and Jones' *World Trade and Payments*. The *Penguin Dictionary of Economics* is also a useful summary reference. I will also make available the lectures from my undergraduate IR/IPE classes for students to use as a resource. If you have questions or concerns about background or want additional reading, please meet with me.

READINGS

All of the readings are available online, either through public sources or UW's library e-journals. I will make some of the readings available on Canvas, as well. If you cannot locate a reading via the library website or the course website, a quick Google search will usually lead you to the right place.

Two books are suggested for purchase:

- Jeffrey A. Frieden. 2007. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Margaret Peters, *Trading Barrier: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization*, Cambridge University Press, 2017.

CLASS POLICIES AND IMPORTANT NOTES

- The best way to reach me is via email at copelovitch@wisc.edu or to speak with me before/after class.
- **Attendance:** If you know that you will be absent from class for religious or other reasons that can be known in advance, please let me know. Remember that participation is fully 30% of your grade, and unexcused/unexplained absences will be noted accordingly.
- **Computers and other electronic devices:** The research evidence is overwhelming that students' recall and absorption of material is inferior when reading electronically. Likewise, there is now abundant evidence that the use of electronic devices have a "second hand smoke" effect on others' ability to absorb information in class. My past experience strongly suggests that laptop use has a large, negative effect on students' participation in graduate seminars and our ability to generate meaningful discussion. Consequently, **I strongly suggest that you do not use laptops or other electronic devices for note-taking during class. I also strongly suggest that you print out all readings that you print and read hard copies of the articles, that you take handwritten notes while you read, and that you go back and review both your notes and the readings before class, so that we can have a focused, detailed seminar discussion.** If technology use becomes a serious block to discussion in class, I will reserve the right to restrict or ban use, with exceptions only for documented medical or learning-related reasons.
- **McBurney accommodations:** Students needing special accommodations to ensure full participation in this course should contact me and your TA as early as possible. All information will remain confidential. You also may contact the McBurney Disability Resource Center regarding questions about campus policies/services.
- **Cheating and plagiarism** are very serious offenses that will not be tolerated in the course. You will receive a failing grade for the class, and the reason for the grade will be noted in your transcript.

INTRODUCTION

September 4: Background: theory, history, and evolution of IPE

The majority of this class session will focus on answering substantive questions about the topics covered in IPE. Please come prepared with any questions – the bar is very low and the goal is to cover background topics on the economics and history of trade, money, and finance that will serve as foundations for the rest of the semester. You might prepare by noting unfamiliar topics in the Frieden book; looking through the syllabus; looking at the news; etc.

Background readings on the economics of international trade and exchange rates:

- (*) Jeff Frieden, David Lake, and Kenneth Schultz, Chapter 6: International Trade,” in *World Politics: Interests, Interactions, Institutions*, pp. 217-259.
- (*) Joseph M. Grieco and John Ikenberry, 2003. “The Economics of International Money and Finance,” 57-91, in *State Power and World Markets* (W.W. Norton: 19-56).

Background on history of the global economy, 1850-present:

- (*) Jeffry A. Frieden. 2007. *Global Capitalism: Its Fall and Rise in the Twentieth Century*. This book will be a continually useful reference to understand the historical context of the issues at stake in IPE as well as applications of the theories we will study.

Background on the intellectual history of IPE as a field within PS/IR:

- Lake, David A. 2009. “Open Economy Politics: A Critical Review.” *Review of International Political Economy* 4: 219-44.
- Cohen, Benjamin J. 2008. *International Political Economy: An Intellectual History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Chapter 1:
<http://assets.press.princeton.edu/chapters/i8665.pdf>.

Finally, some thoughts on graduate seminars:

- <https://twitter.com/FabioGhironi/status/946991989202944000>
- <https://twitter.com/TrevonDLogan/status/947535807841230848>
- <https://twitter.com/jrpjrpjrp/status/893474409767256064>

Further reading

- Adam Smith. 1895. *An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. London: T. Nelson and Sons, Paternoster Row.

- George J. Stigler 1971. The Theory of Economic Regulation. *The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science* 2 (1):3-21.
- Sam Peltzman. 1976. Toward a More General Theory of Regulation. *Journal of Law and Economics* 19 (2):211-240.
- Douglas Irwin, *Against the Tide: An Intellectual History of Free Trade* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997).
- Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, New York: Bloomsbury, 2015 [1988]: Prologue and Chapters 1 and 2.
- Mancur Olson, Jr. 1965. *The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups*. Harvard University Press.
- Charles Kindleberger. 1973. *The World In Depression*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Keynes, John Maynard. 1919. *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*. <https://www.gutenberg.org/files/15776/15776-h/15776-h.htm>

SECTION 1: INTERNATIONAL TRADE

September 11: Domestic politics: interests, preferences, and ideas

Background theory

- James E. Alt, Jeffry Frieden, Michael J. Gilligan, Dani Rodrik, and Ronald Rogowski, 1996. "The Political Economy of International Trade: Enduring Puzzles and an Agenda for Inquiry," *Comparative Political Studies* 29(6): 689-717.
- Marc J. Melitz and Daniel Trefler, 2012. "Gains From Trade When Firms Matter," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 26(2): 91-118.

Research articles

- Edward Mansfield and Diana Mutz, 2009. "Support for Free Trade: Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-group Anxiety." *International Organization* 63(2): 425-57.
- John S. Ahlquist, Amanda B. Clayton, and Margaret Levi. 2014. "Provoking Preferences: Unionization, Workers' Attitudes toward International Trade, and the ILWU Puzzle." *International Organization* 68(1): 33-75.

- In Song Kim. 2017. "Political cleavages within industry: Firm-level lobbying for trade liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 111(1):1-20.
- J. Bradford Jensen, Dennis P. Quinn, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. "Winners and Losers in International Trade: The Effects on US Presidential Voting." *International Organization* 71(3): 423-57.
- James Ashley Morrison, 2012. Before Hegemony: Adam Smith, American Independence, and the Origins of the First Era of Globalization, *International Organization* 66(3): 395-428.
- Erica Owen and Noel P. Johnston. 2017. "Occupation and the Political Economy of Trade: Job Routineness, Offshorability, and Protectionist Sentiment." *International Organization* 71(4): 665-699.

Further reading

- Rho, S. and Tomz, M., 2017. Why Don't Trade Preferences Reflect Economic Self-Interest?. *International Organization*, 71(1): 85-108.
- Helen Milner. 1999. "The Political Economy of International Trade," *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 91-114.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1987. "Political Cleavages and Changing Exposure to Trade." *American Political Science Review* 81(4):1121-1137.
- Michael J. Hiscox. 2001. "Class Versus Industry Cleavages: Inter-Industry Factor Mobility and the Politics of Trade." *International Organization* 55(1): 1-46.
- Megumi Naoi and Ikue Kume. 2011. "Explaining Mass Support for Agricultural Protectionism: Evidence from a Survey Experiment during the Global Recession." *International Organization* 65(4): 771-95.
- Rodrik, Dani. 2014. "When Ideas Trump Interests: Preferences, Worldviews, and Policy Innovations." *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 28(1): 189-208.
- Mayda, Anna, & Dani Rodrik. 2005. "Why Are Some People (and Countries) More Protectionist Than Others?" *European Economic Review* 49(6): 1393–1430.
- Margalit, Yotam. 2011. "Costly Jobs: Trade-related Layoffs, Government Compensation, and Voting in US Elections." *American Political Science Review* 105(1): 169-88.
- Kenneth F. Scheve and Matthew J. Slaughter. 2001. "What Determines Individual Trade-Policy Preferences?" *Journal of International Economics* 54 (3):267-92.

- Hainmueller, Jens, & Michael Hiscox. 2006. "Learning to Love Globalization: Education and Individual Attitudes Toward International Trade." *International Organization* 60(2): 469–498.
- Magee, Stephen. 1980. "Three simple tests of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem." In Peter Oppenheimer, ed., *Issues in International Economics* (London: Oriel Press): 138-153.
- Douglas A. Irwin and Randall S. Kroszner, 1996. "Log-Rolling and Economic Interests in the Passage of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff," *Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy* 45 (December), 173-200.

September 18: Domestic politics: institutions

Background theory

- Alt, James E., & Michael Gilligan. 1994. "The Political Economy of Trading States: Factor Specificity, Collective Action Problems, and Domestic Political Institutions." *Journal of Political Philosophy* 2(2): 165–192.
- Gene Grossman and Elhanan Helpman. 1994. "Protection for Sale." *American Economic Review* 84(4): 833-50.

Research articles

- Douglas Irwin. 2008. "Antebellum Tariff Politics: Regional Coalitions and Shifting Economic Interests." *Journal of Law and Economics* 51(4): 715-741.
- Michael J. Hiscox. 1999. "The Magic Bullet? The RTAA, Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization." *International Organization* 53 (4): 669-698.
- Daniel Y. Kono, 2006. "Optimal Obfuscation: Democracy and Trade Policy Transparency," *American Political Science Review* 100(3): 369-284.
- Alexandra Guisinger, 2009, Determining Trade Policy: Do Voters Hold Politicians Accountable? *International Organization* 63, 533-557.
- Leonardo Baccini, Andreas Duer, and Manfred Elsig, 2015. "The Politics of Trade Agreement Design: Revisiting the Depth-Flexibility Nexus." *International Studies Quarterly* 59(4): 765-775.
- Julia Gray. 2014. "Domestic Capacity and the Implementation Gap in Regional Trade Agreements." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(1): 55-84.

Further reading

- Krugman, Paul. 1987. "Is Free Trade Passé?" *Economic Perspectives* 1(2): 131-144.
- Goldberg, Pinelopi K., & Giovanni Maggi. 1999. "Protection for Sale: An Empirical Investigation." *American Economic Review* 89(5): 1135–1155.
- Mansfield, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, & B. Peter Rosendorff. 2000. "Free to Trade: Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 305–321.
- Fiona McGillivray, Party Discipline as a Determinant of the Endogenous Formation of Tariffs. *American Journal of Political Science* 41, 2 (April 1997): 584-607.
- Baldwin, Robert E., & Christopher Magee. 2000. "Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills." *Public Choice* 105(1–2): 79–101.
- Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry R. Weingast, 1997. "The Institutional Roots of American Trade Policy: Politics, Coalitions, and International Trade," *World Politics* 49(3): 309-338.
- Milner, Helen, and Keiko Kubota. 2005. Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and Trade Policy in the Developing Countries. *International Organization* 59: 107-143.
- Edward D. Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and Jon C. Pevehouse, 2007. "Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements," *British Journal of Political Science*, 37(3): 403-32.

September 25: International politics: power and institutions

Background theory

- Paul Milgrom, Douglass North, and Barry Weingast. 1990. "The Role of Institutions in the Revival of Trade." *Economics and Politics* 2(1): 1-23.
- Giovanni, Maggi. 1999. "The Role of Multilateral Institutions in International Trade." *American Economic Review* 89 (1): 190–214.
- Krasner, Stephen D. 1976. "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28 (3): 317–47.

Research articles

- Mansfield, Edward D., and Eric Reinhardt. 2008. "International Institutions and the Volatility of International Trade." *International Organization* 62(4): 621-652.
- Rosendorff, B. Peter, & Helen V. Milner. 2001. "The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape." *International Organization* 55(4): 829–857.

- Krzysztof Pelc, 2011. "Why do Some Countries Get Better WTO Accession Terms than Others?" *International Organization* 65(4): 639-72.
- Leonardo Baccini, Pablo M. Pinto, and Stephen Weymouth. 2017. "The Distributional Consequences of Preferential Trade Liberalization: Firm-Level Evidence." *International Organization* 71(2): 373-395.
- Mark S. Manger, 2012. "Vertical Trade Specialization and the Formation of North-South PTAs." *World Politics* 64 (4): 622-58.

Further reading

- Christina L. Davis and Meredith Wilf, 2017. "Joining the Club: Accession to the GATT/WTO." *Journal of Politics* 79(3).
- Marc L. Busch. 2007. "Overlapping Institutions, Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade." *International Organization* 61(4): 735-761.
- Tomz, Michael, Judith L. Goldstein, & Douglas Rivers. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Comment." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2005-2018.
- Rose, Andrew K. 2007. "Do We Really Know That the WTO Increases Trade? Reply." *American Economic Review* 97(5): 2019-2025.
- Edward D. Mansfield and Eric Reinhardt, 2003. "Multilateral Determinants of Regionalism: The Effects of GATT/WTO on the Formation of Preferential Trading Arrangements," *International Organization*, 57(4): 829-62.
- Robert W. Staiger and Guido Tabellini, 1999. "Do GATT Rules Help Governments Make Domestic Commitments?" *Economics and Politics* 11(2): 109-144.
- Stephen D. Krasner, "State Power and the Structure of International Trade." *World Politics* 28 (April 1976), 317-347.
- Edward Mansfield, Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. 2002. "Why Democracies Cooperate More: Electoral Control and International Trade Agreements." *International Organization* 56: 3 (Summer), pp. 477-514.
- Limao, Nuno 2006. "Preferential Trade Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence for the United States." *American Economic Review* 96(3): 896-914.
- Christina Davis. 2004. "International Institutions and Issue Linkage: Building Support for Agricultural Trade Liberalization." *American Political Science Review* 98:153-169.

- Mark Copelovitch and David Ohls. 2012. "Trade, Institutions, and the Timing of GATT/WTO Accession in Post-Colonial States." *Review of International Organizations* 7(1): 81-107.

SECTION 2: EXCHANGE RATES, MONETARY POLICY, FISCAL POLICY

October 2: Political economy of exchange rates

Article review paper due Friday, October 4

Background theory

- Jeffrey Frieden, 2015. "Introduction: The Political Economy of Currency Choice," Ch. 1. Of *Currency Politics: The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Policy* (<http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/i10364.pdf>).
- Maurice Obstfeld and Alan Taylor. 2017. "International Monetary Relations: Taking Finance Seriously." *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31(3): 3-28.

Research articles

- Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin. 2010. "The Slide to Protectionism in the Great Depression: Who Succumbed and Why?" *Journal of Economic History* 70(4): 871-97.
- J. Lawrence Broz and Seth H. Werfel. 2014. "Exchange Rates and Industry Demands for Trade Protection." *International Organization* 68(2): 393-416.
- (*) Kathleen McNamara, 1998. *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Politics in the European Union*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, pp. 13-71.
- David Steinberg and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy. *World Politics* 66(3): 491-529.
- James Ashley Morrison. 2016. "Shocking Intellectual Austerity: The Role of Ideas in the Demise of the Gold Standard in Britain." *International Organization* 70(1): 171-207.
- (*) John S. Ahlquist, Mark Copelovitch, and Stefanie Walter. 2020. "The Political Economy of External Shocks: Evidence from Poland." *American Journal of Political Science*.

Further reading

- Mundell, Robert A. 1961. "A Theory of Optimum Currency Areas." *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 51, No. 4: 657-665.

- Jeffrey Frieden. 1991. "Invested Interests: The Politics of National Economic Policies in a World of Global Finance," *International Organization* 45(4): 425-51.
- Jeffrey A. Frankel. 1999. "No Single Currency Regime is Right for All Countries or at all Times." *Essays in International Finance* No. 215, Princeton University (August):1-45.
- David Bearce. 2003. "Societal Principals, Partisan Agents, and Monetary Policy Outcomes." *International Organization* 57: 2 (Spring), pp. 373-410.
- Obstfeld, Maurice, Jay C. Shambaugh, & Alan M. Taylor. 2005. "The Trilemma in History: Tradeoffs Among Exchange Rates, Monetary Policies, and Capital Mobility." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 87(3): 423–438.
- Ernesto Stein, et al. 2005. "Real Exchange Rate Cycles Around Elections." *Economics and Politics*, 17 (3), 297-329.
- J. Lawrence Broz, "The Domestic Politics of International Monetary Order: The Gold Standard," in *Contested Social Orders and International Politics*, David Skidmore, ed. (Vanderbilt University Press, 1997): 53-91. Reprinted in Frieden and Lake, *International Political Economy*.
- Guisinger, Alexandra, and David Andrew Singer. 2010. "Exchange Rate Proclamations and Inflation-Fighting Credibility." *International Organization* 64 (Spring): 313-37.
- Jon Pevehouse and Mark Copelovitch. 2013. "Ties That Bind? Preferential Trade Agreements and Exchange Rate Policy Choice," *International Studies Quarterly* 57(2): 385-99.
- Gowa, Joanne. 1988. "Public goods and political institutions: trade and monetary policy processes in the United States." *International Organization* 42(1): 15-32.

October 9: NO CLASS (YOM KIPPUR)

October 16: Political economy of monetary and fiscal policy

Background theory

- William Bernhard, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark, 2002. "The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions." *International Organization* 56(4): 693–723.
- Jeffrey Frieden. 2015. "The Political Economy of Adjustment and Rebalancing." *Journal of International Money and Finance*
https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jfrieden/files/frieden_jimfproof_dec14.pdf.

Research articles

- William Roberts Clark and Vincent Arel-Bundock. 2013. "Independent But Not Indifferent: Partisan Bias in Monetary Policy at the Fed." *Economics and Politics* 25(1): 1-26.
- Cristina Bodea and Raymond Hicks. 2015. "Price Stability and Central Bank Independence: Discipline, Credibility, and Democratic Institutions." *International Organization* 69(1): 35-61.
- J. Lawrence Broz and Michael Plouffe. 2010. The Effectiveness of Monetary Policy Anchors: Firm-Level Evidence." *International Organization* 64(3): 695-717.
- W. Kindred Winecoff. 2014. "Bank Regulation, Macroeconomic Management, and Monetary Incentives in OECD Economies." *International Studies Quarterly* 58(3): 448-61.
- Mark S. Manger and Thomas Sattler. 2019. "The Origins of Persistent Current Account Imbalances." *Comparative Political Studies*.
<https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0010414019859031>.
- Matthias Matthijs and Kathleen McNamara. 2015. "The Euro Crisis' Theory Effect: Northern Saints, Southern Sinners, and the Demise of the Eurobond." *Journal of European Integration* 37(2): 229-45.

Further reading

- William Roberts Clark and Mark Hallerberg, 2000. "Mobile Capital, Domestic Institutions, and Electorally-Induced Monetary and Fiscal Policy," *American Political Science Review* 94(2): 323-346.
- Nicole Baerg and Mark Hallerberg. 2016. "Explaining Instability in the Stability and Growth Pact: The Contribution of Member State Power and Euroskepticism to the Euro Crisis." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(7).
- Kathleen McNamara. 2002. Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of Delegation. *West European Politics*
(<https://docs.google.com/a/georgetown.edu/file/d/0B3zaCmyJADI2SWdxX0JZV2c1Q2s/edit?pli=1>).

SECTION 3: INTERNATIONAL FINANCE

October 23: International finance and domestic politics

Background: capital controls and capital flows

- Neely, Christopher J. 1999. "An Introduction to Capital Controls," *Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* 81 (6): 13-30
(<http://research.stlouisfed.org/publications/review/99/11/9911cn.pdf>).
- Kose, M. Ayhan , Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff, and Shang-Jin Wei. 2006. "Financial Globalization: A Reappraisal." *IMF Staff Papers* 56(1)
(<http://prasad.dyson.cornell.edu/doc/research/imfsp200836a.pdf>).

Research articles

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November 27: NO CLASS (THANKSGIVING)

SECTION 4: MORE TOPICS, NOT ENOUGH TIME

December 4: Foreign aid, migration, remittances, climate change

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